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Abstract
The two sides of envy, destructive and competitive, give rise to qualitatively different equilib-
ria, depending on the economic, institutional, and cultural environment. If inequality is high,
property rights are poorly protected, and social comparisons are strong, society is likely to
be in the “fear equilibrium,” in which better endowed agents restrain their efforts to prevent
destructive envy of the relatively poor. In the opposite case, the standard “keeping up with
the Joneses” competition arises, and individuals satisfy their positional concerns through sub-
optimally high efforts. The different nature of these equilibria leads to strikingly contrasting
effects of envy on economic performance. From a welfare perspective, the adoption of better
institutions that move the economy away from the low-output fear equilibrium may not be
Pareto improving since it aggravates the negative consumption externality. In a dynamic
setting, envy-avoidance behavior, dictated by the destructive side of envy, reduces inequal-
ity and paves the way to emulation, driven by its competitive side. The paper provides a
foundation for understanding the evolving role of envy in the process of development.
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1 Introduction
In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that variations in cultural character-
istics contribute to differential development paths across the globe. Trust, religion, family
ties, and risk attitudes are among the attributes shown to have profound effects on eco-
nomic outcomes.1 This paper takes a new look at the role of envy, another prominent
cultural force guiding human behavior.
Although concern for relative standing is widely recognized as a salient feature of in-
dividuals interacting in a society, there is no agreement on how it affects the economy,
either directly, through its impact on incentives to work and invest, or indirectly, through
its connections to institutions and culture.2 In some parts of the world people engage
in conspicuous consumption and overworking, driven by competition for status, while in
others they hide their wealth and underinvest, constrained by the fear of malicious envy.
This paper develops a unified framework capturing the qualitatively different equilibria
that can emerge in the presence of concern for relative standing, depending on the economic,
institutional, and cultural environment. It sheds new light on the implications of positional
concerns for economic performance and social welfare, and adds a new perspective to the
analysis of redistributive mechanisms and the dynamics of wealth inequality.
Throughout the paper envy is taken to be a characteristic of preferences that makes
people care about how their own consumption level compares to that of their reference
group. This operational definition implies that envy can be satisfied in two major ways: by
increasing own outcome (competitive envy) and by decreasing the outcome of the reference
group (destructive envy).3 Given the two sides of envy, individuals face a fundamental
trade-off. On the one hand, they strive for higher relative standing. On the other hand,
they want to avoid the destructive envy of those falling behind. The way this trade-off is
resolved shapes the role of envy in society.
1For a state-of-the-art overview see Ferna´ndez (2011) and other chapters in Benhabib et al. (2011).
2A number of evolutionary theoretic explanations have been proposed for why people care about relative
standing, see Hopkins (2008, section 3) and Robson and Samuelson (2011, section 4.2) for an overview.
Evidence in support for positional concerns is abundant and comes from empirical happiness research
(Luttmer, 2005), experimental economics (Zizzo, 2003; Rustichini, 2008), neuroscience (Fliessbach et al.,
2007), and surveys (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010); see Clark et al. (2008, section
3) and Frank and Heffetz (2011, section 3) for an overview.
3An alternative option is to drop out of competition for status (Banerjee, 1990; Barnett et al., 2010).
Yet another possibility is to redefine the reference group, see Falk and Knell (2004) for a model with
endogenous formation of reference standards.
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The basic model is set up as a simple two-stage dynamic game between two individuals
who are each other’s reference points. In the first stage of the game each individual exerts
effort that, combined with endowment, yields an investment outcome, or potential output.
In the second stage, the available time may be spent on the realization of own potential
output and disruption of the other individual’s production process. The optimal allocation
of time between productive and destructive activities depends on the disparity of invest-
ment outcomes and the tolerance for inequality, the latter being determined endogenously
by the level of property rights protection (effectiveness of destruction technology) and the
strength of social comparisons. The unique equilibrium of the model can be of three dif-
ferent types that are broadly consistent with the conflicting evidence on the role of envy
from around the world.
If the initial inequality is low and/or the tolerance for inequality is high, the familiar
“keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) equilibrium arises. In this case individuals com-
pete peacefully for their relative standing, and the consumption externality leads to high
effort and output. These are typical characteristics of a consumer society prominently
documented for the U.S. by Schor (1991) and Matt (2003).
Higher inequality and/or lower tolerance for inequality may lead to the “fear equilib-
rium,” in which the better endowed individual anticipates destructive envy and prevents
it by restricting effort at the investment stage. Such envy-avoidance behavior is standard
for traditional agricultural communities in developing economies, where the fear of inciting
envy discourages production (Foster, 1979; Dow, 1981). It is also typical for the emerging
markets like China and Russia, where potential entrepreneurs are reluctant to start new
business that can provoke envious retaliation of others (Mui, 1995).
Finally, if the tolerance for inequality is very low and/or the distribution of endowments
is highly unequal, a “destructive equilibrium” arises, in which actual conflict takes place and
time is wasted unproductively to satisfy envy. Allowing for transfers replaces destructive
activities of the poor with “voluntary” sharing of the rich, reflecting the evidence on the
fear-of-envy motivated redistribution in peasant societies of Latin America (Cancian, 1965),
Southeast Asia (Scott, 1976), and Africa (Platteau, 2000).
The qualitatively different nature of these equilibria leads to opposite effects of posi-
tional concerns on aggregate economic performance. In the KUJ equilibrium envy increases
effort and output by intensifying status competition, while in the fear equilibrium it ag-
gravates the already binding “fear of envy constraint” further discouraging investment.
Another striking difference between the alternative equilibria becomes clear in a com-
parative welfare analysis. While better institutions can move the society from the low-
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output fear equilibrium to the high-output KUJ equilibrium, such change need not be
welfare enhancing if it triggers the “rat race” competition. That is, individuals may be
happier in the fear equilibrium, since the threat of destructive envy constrains the subop-
timally high efforts induced in the KUJ equilibrium.
A dynamic version of the model explores the transitions between equilibria. It shows
how the implications of envy change endogenously as the society evolves from destructive
equilibrium to the long-run KUJ steady state, following the dynamics of inequality. In
this setting, institutional and cultural parameters not only affect economic outcomes at
a given point in time but also determine the division of the transition process into three
“envy regimes” qualitatively corresponding to the equilibria of the static model. Initially,
destructive envy and the fear of it reduce inequality by discouraging productive effort of
the better endowed individual or destroying part of his output. This leads to more equal
investment opportunities for next generations, up to the point when it becomes optimal to
compete productively. Thus, envy-avoidance behavior, dictated by the destructive side of
envy, eventually paves the way to emulation, driven by its competitive side. This transition
can be delayed or accelerated by factors, such as religion, political ideology, and legal
institutions, that affect the strength of social comparisons and the relative attractiveness
of productive and destructive effort.
The model is designed to be “scale-free,” that is, inequality, but not the scale of pro-
duction, is the key variable of the analysis. Nevertheless, it provides a foundation for
understanding the evolving role of envy in the process of development. Specifically, Ger-
shman (2011b) incorporates the basic model of this paper in a simple endogenous growth
framework, in which resources are limited and productivity is driven by learning-by-doing
and knowledge spillovers. Rising productivity expands the production possibilities fron-
tier, and the economy experiences an endogenous transition from the fear equilibrium to
the KUJ equilibrium. At the same time, the type of equilibrium at each point feeds back
into the growth rate of productivity by constraining or spurring investment. Such analysis
explicitly connects the alternative types of equilibria to different stages of economic devel-
opment, consistent with the evidence of the following section, and qualifies some results of
the static model by accounting for the long-run dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the evidence on
the two sides of envy. Section 3 lays out the basic model and examines comparative
statics. Section 4 conducts the welfare analysis. Section 5 considers the implications of
allowing voluntary transfers. Section 6 presents the dynamic version of the model. Section
7 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
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2 Evidence on the Two Sides of Envy
As wealth increases, the continued stimulus of em-
ulation would make each man strive to surpass,
or at least not fall below, his neighbours, in this.
Richard Whately (1831)
Introductory Lectures on Political Economy
The aﬄuence of the rich excites the indignation of
the poor, who are often both driven by want, and
prompted by envy, to invade his possessions.
Adam Smith (1776)
The Wealth of Nations
As exemplified by the quotations above, the distinction between competitive and de-
structive sides of envy in economics goes back to the classicists. Since then, this dichotomy
has been discussed extensively by anthropologists (Foster, 1972), philosophers (D’Arms
and Kerr, 2008), political scientists (Ferna´ndez de la Mora, 1987), psychologists4 (Smith
and Kim, 2007), sociologists (Schoeck, 1969; Clanton, 2006), and recently got a renewed
interest from economists (Elster, 1991; Zizzo, 2008; Mitsopoulos, 2009).
Evidence on the destructive potential of envy comes primarily from the developing
world. For instance, recent data from the Afrobarometer surveys5 indicate that envy is
perceived as an important source of conflict. Respondents were asked the following ques-
tion: “Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts most often arise between different
groups in this country?” They were offered to choose the three most important problems
from a list of several dozens of possible answers (such as religion, ethnic differences, eco-
nomic issues). Remarkably, in nine countries, where the list featured “envy/gossip” as a
potential source of violent conflict, an average of over 9% of respondents have picked it as
one of the three most important reasons.
The threat of destructive envy naturally leads to a rational fear of it that motivates
envy-avoidance behavior. Numerous examples of such behavior come from anthropological
research on small-scale agricultural communities around the world. According to Foster
(1972), in peasant societies “a man fears being envied for what he has, and wishes to
protect himself from the consequences of the envy of others” (p. 166). People are reluctant
to exert effort or innovate since they expect sanctions in the form of plain destruction,
forced redistribution, or envy-driven supernatural punishment.6
4Certain psychological approaches treat benign and malicious envy as two separate emotions (van de
Ven et al., 2009). The present theory is crucially different in that the motive, envy, is the same, but its
manifestation is an equilibrium outcome.
5Second round, 2002–2003; raw data available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.
6The rational fear of envy becomes curiously embedded in culture. The term “institutionalized envy”
coined by Wolf (1955) summarizes the set of cultural control mechanisms related to the fear of envy
including gossip, fear of witchcraft, and the evil eye belief. See Gershman (2011a) for more details.
4
In Tzintzuntzan, a Mexican village, people do not go beyond minimum conveniences
even if they can afford it (Foster, 1979). A relatively wealthy peasant refuses to lay a
cement or tile floor, or cut windows in his rooms since he is “frankly afraid people will envy
him” (p. 154). Similarly, the “envious hostility of neighbors” discourages the villagers of
Northern Sierra de Puebla, also in Mexico, to produce food beyond subsistence (Dow, 1981).
In peasant communities of Southeast Asia people work “in large measure through the
abrasive force of gossip and envy and the knowledge that the abandoned poor are likely to
be a real and present danger to better-off villagers” (Scott, 1976, p. 5).
The fear of destructive envy is not an exclusive feature of simple agricultural societies.
Mui (1995) focuses on the large industrial economies, Russia and China, in the process of
transition to the free market. He brings up evidence on emerging cooperative restaurants
and shops in the Soviet Union being regularly attacked by people resenting the success
of their owners. Mui then tells a similar story of a Chinese peasant whose successful
entrepreneurship provoked the envious neighbors to steal timber for his new house and
kill his farm animals. “I dare not work too hard to get rich again” was his comment.
The fear of envy may be a particularly serious issue in societies with socialist experience
characterized by the ideology of material egalitarianism and neglect of private property
rights, both reducing the tolerance for inequality.
A very different strand of evidence comes from the modern consumer societies, in which
the competitive side of envy is predominant and the fear of destructive envy vanishes. As
observed with dismay by the Christian Advocate newspaper (1926), consumer society offers
a new version of the tenth commandment: “Thou shalt not be outdone by thy neighbor’s
house, thou shalt not be outdone by thy neighbor’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his car, nor
anything – irrespective of its price or thine own ability – anything that is thy neighbor’s”
(cited in Matt, 2003, p. 4). Benign consumer envy becomes the target of producers and
salesmen (Belk, 2008).
Under “keeping up with the Joneses” envy acts a stimulus to work harder to be able to
match the spending patterns of the reference group.7 According to Schor (1991), the steady
increase in work hours in the U.S. since the early 1970s is primarily due to the competitive
effects of social comparisons. The positive impact of relative standing concerns on labor
supply in developed economies is supported by rigorous empirical research. Neumark and
Postlewaite (1998) study the employment decisions of women using data from the U.S.
7As argued by Frank (2007), hard work is not the only way to keep up with the Joneses in the con-
sumption domain, the most worrisome alternative being reduced savings.
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National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and find evidence that those are partly driven by
relative income. Bowles and Park (2005) use the aggregate data from ten OECD countries
over the period 1963–1998 to show that greater earnings inequality is associated with longer
work hours. They attribute this finding to the Veblen effect of the consumption of the rich
on the less wealthy, that is, emulation.
Overworking caused by competitive envy and the welfare consequences of the KUJ-type
competition have become the subject of recent research in the field of happiness economics
(Graham, 2010). In particular, accounting for the relative standing concern is one of the
keys to understanding why happiness and material well-being might not always go together.
In the words of Schor (1991, p. 124), those caught in a race for relative standing “would be
better off with more free time; but without cooperation, they will stick to the long hours,
high consumption choice.”
The controversial evidence on the role of envy in society poses a number of questions.
How does the same feature, concern for relative standing, give rise to these qualitatively
different cases? Under what conditions do the fear of envy or the KUJ competition emerge?
What are the implications of social comparisons for economic performance and welfare?
The first step towards thinking about these issues is to construct a unified framework
reconciling the above evidence.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Environment
Consider two agents that may be thought of as representatives of equal-sized homogeneous
groups of people. They differ only in the amount of broadly defined initial endowments,
Ki, i = 1, 2. In particular,
K1 = λK, K2 = (1− λ)K, (1)
where K is the total endowment in the economy and parameter 0 < λ < 1/2 captures the
degree of initial inequality: Agent 1 is “poor” and Agent 2 is “rich.” They interact in the
following two-stage game (see Figure 1).
In the first stage of the game both agents invest, for instance, in education or innova-
tion. Specifically, each agent exerts effort, Li > 0, to produce an investment outcome, Yi,
according to
Yi = F (Ki, Li) = KiLi, i = 1, 2. (2)
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Effort Li Outcomes Yi
Stage 1 (Investment) Stage 2 (Production, Destruction, Consumption)
Production/Destruction di Consumption Ci Payoffs U
i
Figure 1: Timing of events in the envy game.
This outcome may be thought of as a factor of production like human or physical capital,
intermediate product, or potential output in general, to be realized in the second stage.
In the second stage, each agent has a unit of time that has to be allocated between
realization of own potential output (production) and disruption of the other agent’s pro-
duction process (destruction). Clearly, in this setup the only reason for spending time on
destruction is envy.8 If Agent i allocates a fraction di ∈ [0, 1] of his time to disrupt the
productive activity of Agent j, the latter retains only a fraction pj of his final output,
where
pj = p(di) =
1
1 + τdi
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (3)
As will become clear, the formulation with time allocation makes the model scale-free:
optimal destruction intensity will be a function of the inequality (but not the scale) of
first-stage outcomes, which captures the essence of destructive envy.9 The function p(di)
has standard properties: it is bounded, with p(0) = 1, decreasing, and convex (Grossman
and Kim, 1995). Parameter τ > 0 measures the effectiveness of destruction technology and
may capture the overall level of private property rights protection. In particular, property
rights are secure if τ is low.
Time 1− di is spent on the realization of potential output Yi yielding the final output
(1− di)Yi. Since only a fraction p(dj) of this output is retained, the consumption level of
Agent i is given by
Ci = (1− di)p(dj)Yi, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (4)
Finally, payoffs are generated. The utility function is of the following form:
U i = U(Ci, Cj, Li) = v(Ci − θCj)− e(Li) = (Ci − θCj)
1−σ
1− σ − Li, (5)
8The model can be generalized to incorporate protection and theft, instead of pure destruction, without
affecting the qualitative results. The implications of defense in a model of appropriation were examined
by Grossman and Kim (1995; 1996).
9If, apart from time, material resources or extra effort are needed to destroy, the scale effect may arise,
which does not change the qualitative results of the basic model, but undermines analytical tractability.
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where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, σ > 1, and 0 < θ < 1.10 It is increasing in own consumption
while decreasing in the other agent’s consumption and own effort. Agents are each other’s
reference points, which is natural in the setup with two individuals, and parameter θ
captures the strength of concern for relative standing. This utility function features additive
comparison which is one of the two most popular ways to model envy, the other being ratio
comparison.11 Overall, the form of the utility function is identical to that in Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000), but in their model the reference point for each agent is the average
consumption in the population.
A crucial property of this utility function is that the cross-partial derivative U12 is
positive, leading to the “keeping up with the Joneses” kind of behavior, or emulation, due
to complementarity between own and reference consumption. Clark and Oswald (1998) call
this a “comparison-concave” utility (since v is concave). Intuitively, individuals are willing
to match an increase in consumption of their reference group. The reason is that an increase
in Cj reduces the consumption rank of individual i and, under concave comparisons, raises
the marginal utility of his own consumption.
Finally, the payoff function implies that consumption is a positional good, while leisure
(disutility of effort) is not. This hypothesis has been consistently advocated by Frank
(1985; 2007) and finds support in the data (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005).
3.2 Equilibria
The dynamic structure of the model makes subgame perfect equilibrium a natural solution
concept. The model is solved backwards, starting at stage 2, when effort is sunk. Given the
outcomes of the investment stage, Y1 and Y2, Agent i chooses the intensity of destruction,
di, to maximize his payoff:
v((1− di)p(dj)Yi − θ(1− dj)p(di)Yj) −→ max
di
s.t. 0 6 di 6 1, (6)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
10Assume for simplicity that U i = −∞ whenever Ci 6 θCj . Since effort is unbounded, this will never
be the case in equilibrium. The assumption on the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to relative
consumption, σ, is a convenient regularity condition that is not crucial for the main results; see also the
discussion in section 3.3. Linearity in effort is assumed for analytical tractability.
11Additive comparison was used, among others, by Knell (1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and
Mitsopoulos (2009). Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Carroll et al. (1997) are examples of models with
ratio comparison. Clark and Oswald (1998) examine the properties of both formulations. Gershman
(2011a) shows that the qualitative results of section 3 can be obtained in a model with ratio comparison.
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This yields the optimal second-stage response12:
d∗i =
 0, if Yi/Yj > τθ(1− dj)(1 + τdj);1
τ
·
(√
τθ
Yj
Yi
(1− dj)(1 + τdj)− 1
)
, if Yi/Yj < τθ(1− dj)(1 + τdj).
(7)
Several features are to be noticed about this expression. First, without envy (θ = 0)
there is no destruction. If envy is present, the decision about engaging in destruction
depends on the inequality of investment outcomes, Yi/Yj. If Yi is high enough compared
to Yj, Agent i finds it optimal to refrain from destruction. Otherwise, it is optimal to
engage in destruction and its intensity is increasing in inequality, effectiveness of destructive
technology, and the strength of positional concerns.
The product τθ is an endogenous measure of tolerance for inequality. Given the ratio
of investment outcomes, destructive envy is more likely to occur if positional concerns are
strong (large θ) and property rights are poorly protected (large τ). Hence, large τθ means
low tolerance for inequality. If dj = 0, the product τθ provides a critical inequality level,
beyond which Agent i chooses to engage in destruction. Assume from now on that τθ < 1,
that is, in the case when dj = 0, there is some tolerance for inequality and d
∗
i = 0 if Yi > Yj.
Given this assumption, the agent with higher investment outcome will never attack in the
second-stage equilibrium, as established in the following lemma.13
Lemma 1. (Second-stage equilibrium). Let Y2 > Y1. Then, in the second-stage equilib-
rium d∗2 = 0 and d
∗
1 is given by
d∗1 =
 0, if Y1/Y2 > τθ;1
τ
·
(√
τθ Y2
Y1
− 1
)
, if Y1/Y2 < τθ.
(8)
Hence, Agent 2 retains a fraction p∗2 of his final output, where
p∗2 = p(d
∗
1) = min
{√
Y1
Y2
· 1
τθ
, 1
}
(9)
and is strictly decreasing in τ , θ, and Y2/Y1, if destruction takes place.
12Clearly, d∗i = 1 is never optimal, see footnote 10. Since the first-stage efforts guarantee that Ci−θCj >
0 in equilibrium, d∗i < 1 is the only relevant case.
13This assumption rules out the case in which individuals with higher relative standing engage in de-
structive activities to push their relative position even further up. While such behavior is a theoretical
possibility, the case considered in this paper is more intuitive and consistent with the anecdotal evidence
on destructive envy from section 2.
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It can be shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the initially better
endowed Agent 2 will always have a higher investment outcome, that is, Y2 > Y1, and so,
given the result above, he will never spend time on destructive activities. For expositional
simplicity we proceed as if there is a “predator and prey” type relationship (Grossman and
Kim, 1996) between Agent 1 and Agent 2 from the outset, so that only the initially poor
Agent 1 is allowed to engage in destruction at stage 2. Such assumption is made without
loss of generality and underlines the asymmetric equilibrium roles played by the agents in
the general formulation of the model.14
Agents are forward-looking and anticipate the optimal second-stage actions when mak-
ing their first-stage decisions. Although Agent 2 is passive at stage 2, he is perfectly aware
of how his investment outcome affects d∗1 and takes this into account at stage 1:
U2 = v(p(d∗1)Y2 − θ(1− d∗1)Y1)− Y2/K2 −→ max
Y2
(10)
For technical reasons, it is easier to analyze the best responses of both agents in terms
of their consumption levels, Ci, rather than the first-stage outcomes Yi. Note that these
are different only if destruction actually takes place. In that case there is a one-to-one
mapping between Yi and Ci.
Lemma 2. (BR of Agent 2). The best-response function of Agent 2, BR2 ≡ C∗2(C1), has
the following form:
C∗2(C1) =

K
1/σ
2 + θC1, if C1 > C˜1;
C1 · 1τθ , if Ĉ1 6 C1 < C˜1;
Cd2 (C1), if C1 < Ĉ1,
(11)
where
C˜1 ≡ τθ
1− τθ2K
1/σ
2 , Ĉ1 ≡
τθ
1− τθ2
(
1 + θ2
2
K2
)1/σ
,
and Cd2 (C1) is implicitly given by
C2 − θC1 = φ ·
(
C1 + θC2
C2
)1/σ
, φ ≡
(
1 + θ2
2θ(1 + τ)
K2
)1/σ
. (12)
The function Cd2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave.
The best response function of Agent 2, depicted in the left panel of Figure 2, consists
of three segments that correspond to the following cases. If the output of Agent 1 is high
14For further analysis of the general case see the Appendix.
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enough, Agent 2 is not constrained by destructive envy and displays the standard KUJ
behavior. If the output of Agent 1 is in the intermediate range, the best response of Agent
2 is to avoid destructive envy by constraining his own effort at stage 1. This is the “fear
segment,” in which Agent 2 exerts the maximum possible effort that prevents destruction
at stage 2. Finally, if the output of Agent 1 is low, it becomes too costly for Agent 2 to
avoid destruction by self-restraint and the optimal action is to allow some of it.
BR2
C1
C2
Ĉ1 C˜1
BR1
C1
C2
Ĉ2
Figure 2: Best responses of Agent 2 (left) and Agent 1 (right).
Agent 1 is also forward-looking and knows his own optimal second-stage behavior when
optimizing at the investment stage:
U1 = v((1− d∗1)Y1 − θp(d∗1)Y2)− Y1/K1 −→ max
Y1
(13)
Lemma 3. (BR of Agent 1).15 The best-response function of Agent 1, BR1 ≡ C∗1(C2), has
the following form:
C∗1(C2) =
{
K
1/σ
1 + θC2, if C2 6 Ĉ2;
Cd1 (C2), if C2 > Ĉ2,
(14)
where
Ĉ2 ≡ K
1/σ
1
θ(τ − 1)
and Cd1 (C2) is implicitly given by
C1 − θC2 = ψ ·
(
C1
C1 + θC2
)1/σ
, ψ ≡
(
1 + τ
τ
K1
)1/σ
. (15)
The function Cd1 (C2) is strictly increasing and convex.
15As follows from the proof of Lemma 3, if τ < 1, it is never optimal for Agent 1 to engage in destruc-
tion, and catching up is always the best response. To focus on the largest set of possible equilibria, the
assumption τ > 1 is maintained throughout the paper.
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The best response function of Agent 1, depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, consists
of two segments. If the output of Agent 2 is low enough, Agent 1 prefers to catch up
peacefully without causing destruction. This is the KUJ case. If, however, Y2 is too high,
second-stage destruction substitutes for some of the first-stage investment.
Depending on parameter values, the envy game may end up in three different types of
equilibria which we consider in turn.
1. Keeping up with the Joneses equilibrium (KUJE). This equilibrium would always
emerge if destruction were not possible (right panel of Figure 3). Its features are well-known
in economics literature and have been formally analyzed by Frank (1985) and Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004), among others. In the present model it arises when the “competitive
segments” of the best response functions intersect (left panel of Figure 3) and is given by
CKUJi = Y
KUJ
i =
K
1/σ
i + θK
1/σ
j
1− θ2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (16)
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
Figure 3: KUJE in the envy game with (left) and without (right) the second stage.
2. Fear equilibrium (FE). In this case the richer agent constrains his first-stage invest-
ment to avoid destructive envy in the second stage of the game. He consumes right at the
point that makes it not optimal for the poorer agent to engage in destruction. This equi-
librium resembles the fear of envy documented in many developing societies, as discussed
in section 2.16 It arises when the “fear segment” of BR2 intersects BR1 at the kink point
(left panel of Figure 4) and is given by
CF1 = Y
F
1 =
τK
1/σ
1
τ − 1 , C
F
2 = Y
F
2 =
K
1/σ
1
θ(τ − 1) . (17)
16Mui (1995) constructs a theoretical framework in which technological innovation may not be adopted
in anticipation of destructive envy. The intuition of the fear equilibrium is similar, except that here the
fear of envy affects the intensive margin by discouraging effort.
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3. Destructive equilibrium (DE). In this equilibrium it is not optimal for Agent 2
to reduce effort to completely avoid destructive envy and he accommodates some of it.
Equilibrium consumption levels are implicitly given by the system of equations{
CD2 = C
d
2 (C
D
1 ),
CD1 = C
d
1 (C
D
2 ).
(18)
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
Figure 4: Fear (left) and destructive (right) equilibria.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows a generic destructive equilibrium, which occurs at
the intersection of “destructive segments.” It follows from the properties of Cd2 (C1) and
Cd1 (C2) that they can only intersect once (see the proof of Proposition 1).
The following proposition provides a full taxonomy of equilibria in terms of the three
main parameters of the model: λ, the initial level of inequality (economic environment),
τ , the degree of property rights protection (institutional environment), and θ, the strength
of social comparisons (cultural environment).
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium of the envy game). There exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the envy game. Denote k ≡ K1/K2. Then, if k > k˜, it is the KUJ
equilibrium (16). If kˆ 6 k < k˜, it is the fear equilibrium (17). Finally, if k < kˆ, it is the
destructive equilibrium (18). The threshold values for k are given by
k˜ ≡
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]σ
, kˆ ≡ (1 + θ
2)
2
·
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]σ
< k˜ < 1. (19)
This result can be expressed in terms of regions for λ, τ , and θ, with the relevant thresholds
uniquely determined by (19).
Given the setup of the game, this result is very intuitive. Other things equal, the
standard KUJ equilibrium is more likely to emerge if the level of initial inequality is low
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and/or the tolerance for inequality is high, that is, property rights are well-protected and
social comparisons are not strong. In the opposite case, destructive envy is in action and
either fear or destructive equilibrium arises. It is important to emphasize that the three
parameters of interest jointly determine the type of equilibrium. For instance, just having
low inequality is not enough to obtain the KUJE. If, at the same time, institutions are
very weak (destructive technology is efficient) and/or relative standing concerns are very
strong, the economy may still end up in the fear or destructive equilibrium.
3.3 Comparative statics
The next issue to address is how the parameters of interest affect economic performance
(measured by final outputs) across different equilibria.
As follows from (16), in the KUJ equilibrium outputs do not depend on τ since de-
structive envy is not binding. The effect of θ is straightforward: increasing the strength of
relative concerns in the KUJ equilibrium acts as additional incentive to work, which leads
to higher levels of effort and output.
The effect of raising λ (increasing equality) on aggregate output depends crucially on
σ. Equations (1) and (16) imply that the total output is
Y KUJ = Y KUJ1 + Y
KUJ
2 =
λ1/σ + (1− λ)1/σ
1− θ K
1
σ . (20)
Under baseline assumption σ > 1, it is a strictly concave and increasing function of λ.
Concavity of output in endowments seems more natural than a kind of nondecreasing
returns to scale that would emerge under σ 6 1.
The total effect of redistribution on private outputs consists of two parts: wealth effects
and comparison effects. Wealth effects are just the direct effects of making one agent
poorer and the other richer. In case of increasing λ the wealth effect is positive for Agent
1 and negative for Agent 2. The total wealth effect on output is positive since under
concave outputs the poor agent is more productive on the margin. Comparison effects
reflect the fact that the reference group becomes poorer for Agent 1 and richer for Agent
2. Consequently, comparison effect is negative for Agent 1 and positive for Agent 2. The
total comparison effect has the same sign as the total wealth effect. In particular, under
σ > 1, the negative comparison effect on the output of the poor is outweighed by the
positive comparison effect on the output of the rich.
Next, consider the fear equilibrium (17). In this case the outcomes depend on τ , the
measure of property rights protection. Raising τ (reducing the quality of institutions)
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decreases the tolerance of Agent 1 for inequality and aggravates the “fear constraint” of
Agent 2. This means that with higher τ Agent 2 has to produce less to avoid destructive
envy which leads to lower total output given by
Y F = Y F1 + Y
F
2 =
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)(λK)
1
σ . (21)
The effect of raising θ is similar since it, too, decreases the tolerance for inequality.
This is in stark contrast with the role of positional concerns in the KUJ equilibrium. In
the latter case it acts as additional incentive to work, while in the fear equilibrium it
constrains productive effort by increasing the hazard of destructive envy. On the other
hand, the effect of raising equality in the fear equilibrium is unambiguously positive, as it
is in the KUJE. Increasing λ means a positive wealth effect for Agent 1 which translates
into higher output of Agent 2. That is, redistribution from the rich to the poor increases
investment and final output by alleviating the fear of envy constraint.
Destructive equilibrium is harder to analyze analytically. Multiple effects are at work
which makes the aggregate comparative statics with respect to θ ambiguous. If inequality is
high or tolerance for inequality is low, stronger envy leads to substantial destruction which
may lower the consumption of Agent 2, as well as total final output, C (left panel of Figure
6). In contrast, if the destructive environment is not severe (or σ, the catching-up propen-
sity, is high), the stimulating effect of envy dominates (right panel of Figure 6). Thus,
comparative statics in the DE combines the features of the FE and the KUJE. Moreover,
it can be shown that higher τ and lower λ unambiguously decrease total consumption. The
following proposition summarizes the comparative statics results.
Proposition 2. (Comparative statics of the envy game).
1. KUJE:
(a) ∂Y/∂λ > 0; ∂Y1/∂λ > 0; ∂Y2/∂λ > 0 iff θ > [(1− λ)/λ] 1−σσ .
(b) ∂Y/∂θ > 0; ∂Yi/∂θ > 0.
(c) ∂Y/∂τ = ∂Yi/∂τ = 0.
2. FE:
(a) ∂Y/∂λ > 0; ∂Yi/∂λ > 0;
(b) ∂Y/∂θ < 0; ∂Y1/∂θ = 0; ∂Y2/∂θ < 0;
(c) ∂Y/∂τ < 0; ∂Yi/∂τ < 0.
3. DE:
(a) ∂C/∂λ > 0; ∂C1/∂λ > 0; ∂C2/∂λ ≶ 0;
(b) ∂C/∂θ ≶ 0; ∂C1/∂θ > 0; ∂C2/∂θ ≶ 0;
(c) ∂C/∂τ < 0; ∂Ci/∂τ < 0.
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Figure 5: Inequality (left), property rights (right), and economic performance.
θ
C
θˆ θ˜0 1/τ
θ
C
θˆ θ˜0 1/τ
Figure 6: Concern for relative standing and economic performance.
Proposition 2 makes clear that the mechanics of the qualitatively different equilibria of
the envy game may imply contrasting comparative statics. Stronger envy is detrimental
for economic performance in the fear equilibrium, increases total output under the KUJ-
type competition, and has an ambiguous effect in the DE. Higher inequality has a negative
effect across all equilibria types. Well-protected private property rights are conducive to
economic performance in both the FE and the DE and play no role beyond the KUJE
threshold. Overall, Proposition 2 establishes the relationship between aggregate economic
performance and the parameters of the model, reflecting the economic, institutional, and
cultural environment (see Figures 5 and 6).
The following section shows that consumption and happiness need not go together when
relative standing is what matters, and hence, the established comparative statics results
need to be challenged in a welfare analysis.
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4 Welfare, property rights, and inequality
In this section we focus on the KUJE and the FE to conduct a comparative welfare analysis.
We start by analyzing how an institutional change affects the welfare of individuals. Then
we show how it is affected by ex-ante redistribution of endowments.
The connection between the emergence of property rights and externalities was famously
considered by Demsetz (1967). He argued that an important function of property rights
is to internalize externalities, and institutional change in this domain is intended to cope
with new externality problems. In the context of the present theory it is the consumption
externality that makes institutions matter. As shown below, it is not the emergence of
property rights protection but its demise that may internalize this externality.
Consider the following thought experiment. Assume that the agents start in the fear
equilibrium. Would they want to accept a lower value of τ that would move them to the
KUJ equilibrium? The following proposition provides conditions under which the agents
will (not) want to adopt such institutional change.
Proposition 3. Let kˆ 6 k < k˜, that is, agents are in the FE. Then, ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that: 1) If θ > θ¯, adopting a (lower) τ that would bring up the KUJ equilibrium is a Pareto
worsening; 2) If θ 6 θ¯, ∃! k¯(τ) ∈ [kˆ, k˜), such that adopting such τ is a Pareto worsening
if and only if k > k¯. Furthermore, private outputs in the initial FE are always lower than
those that would have been achieved by improving the property rights protection.
The intuition for this result is simple and revolves around the negative effect of posi-
tional externality on social welfare. As shown in the proof of the above proposition, Agent
1 always prefers the FE. In particular, he maintains the same level of relative consumption
in the two equilibria, but the amount of effort he has to exert to do that is always lower
in the FE. The rich agent prefers to stay in the FE if only if in the alternative KUJE he
would have to work too hard to support his relative standing. That would be the case
if either social comparisons are strong (θ is high) or inequality is low (k is large). Under
these conditions the FE is Pareto dominant since the fear of destructive envy restrains
effort and curbs the consumption externality that otherwise leads to overworking in the
KUJ equilibrium. Thus, worse property rights protection corrects the distortion caused by
positional concerns.17
17Curiously, this is akin to the effects of Pareto improving redistributive taxation schemes suggested in
similar contexts by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), and Frank (1985).
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Figure 7: From FE to KUJE: Improving the property rights protection.
Figure 7 illustrates the case, in which moving from FE to KUJE is a Pareto worsening
(left panel) in spite of increased private outputs (right panel).18 The result that both
agents can be better off in an equilibrium with lower consumption is reminiscent of what
Graham (2010) calls the “paradox of happy peasants and miserable millionaires” and the
related research in happiness economics.19 It is instructive to read Proposition 3 in the
“reverse” order, assuming that initially agents are in the KUJ equilibrium.
Proposition 3′. Let k > k˜, that is, agents are in the KUJE. Then, ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that: 1) If θ > θ¯, adopting a (higher) τ that would bring up the FE is a Pareto improvement;
2) If θ 6 θ¯, ∃! k¯(τ) ∈ [kˆ, k˜), such that adopting such τ is a Pareto improvement if and only
if k > k¯. Furthermore, private outputs in the initial KUJE are always higher than those
that would have been achieved by distorting the property rights protection.
Taken literally, Proposition 3′ may be seen as a formalization of a more than a century-
old argument raised by Veblen (1891) in an attempt to explain the support for socialist
movement, specifically, for the abolition of private property rights. Veblen argued that
such support was driven by the competitive envy of a consumer society (p. 65–66): “The
ground of the unrest with which we are concerned is, very largely, jealousy, – envy, if you
choose: and the ground of this particular form of jealousy that makes for socialism, is to
be found in the institution of private property.”
18It can be shown that a result similar to Proposition 3 holds in the region corresponding to the fear
equilibrium. In particular, if the strength of positional externality, θ, is high enough, both agents would
be better off with higher τ . Yet this does not hold in the destructive equilibrium.
19 While intuitive in a static model, this result need not hold in a dynamic framework. Gershman
(2011b) shows in a simple endogenous growth model that the long-run KUJ steady state may well Pareto
dominate the FE due to labor-saving productivity growth supported by higher effort levels.
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Veblen goes on to describe what in the model can be called a transition from the
KUJE (“keep up appearances”) to the FE (“socialism”): “The ultimate ground of this
struggle to keep up appearances by otherwise unnecessary expenditure, is the institution
of private property. . . With the abolition of private property, the characteristic of human
nature which now finds its exercise in this form of emulation, should logically find exercise
in other, perhaps nobler and socially more serviceable, activities.” He then emphasizes
that the abolition of the KUJ competition would lessen the amount of labor and output
required to support the economy. This is exactly what happens after transition to the fear
equilibrium: output and labor supply fall, individuals enjoy more leisure and are, at least
initially, happier with less output (see, however, footnote 19). As discussed above, the
rich may prefer well-protected property rights if inequality is high enough, since moving to
the FE would mean losing too much in terms of relative standing. Thus, in a KUJE with
relatively high inequality there is a conflict of interests, or, in Veblen’s terms, opposite
sentiments towards the socialist movement.
If a Pareto improvement can be achieved by increasing τ , can it be accomplished through
ex-ante redistribution of endowments from the tich to the poor (increasing k)?
Proposition 4. Let kˆ 6 k < k˜, that is, agents are in the FE. Then: 1) U1F is strictly
increasing in k; 2) U2F is either strictly decreasing in k or has a global maximum at
k∗ =
√
1 + 4σδ − 1
2σ
, δ ≡ θ(τ − 1)
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]1−σ
,
where kˆ < k∗ < k˜. Furthermore, if k > k˜, U2KUJ is strictly decreasing in k, while U1KUJ is
strictly increasing in k.
Proposition 4 implies that, while redistribution is always desirable for the poor agent,
from the point of view of the rich agent it can only be beneficial under certain conditions
and only to a certain extent. In particular, switching to the KUJE via a decrease in initial
inequality cannot result in a Pareto worsening or a Pareto improvement, since the poor
always win while the rich always lose. The big difference between an institutional change
analyzed above and an ex-ante redistribution is that in the latter case the rich are actually
giving away part of their endowment, lowering their own productivity and increasing the
productivity of the poor.
If endowments represent ability or other indivisible resource, ex-ante redistribution
is not feasible. In that case agents can potentially share the fruits of their first-stage
investment. The following section modifies the basic model to allow for voluntary transfers
of this sort and examines its implications.
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5 Envy and Redistribution
It is not surprising that a common way to deal with destructive envy is through redistribu-
tion of various forms. Cancian (1965) and Foster (1979) examine redistributive practices
in Latin American peasant societies, such as ceremonial expenditures and sponsorship of
religious fiestas by the rich (cargo system). In particular, Cancian (1965, p. 140) suggests
that “service in the cargo system legitimizes the wealth differences that do exist and thus
prevents disruptive envy.” Platteau (2000, chapter 5) examines similar arrangements in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asian village communities, where “in seeking neighbourer’s good-
will or in fearing their envy, incentives operate for the rich to redistribute income and
wealth to the poor” (p. 235).
Mui (1995, section 4) discusses sharing in the emerging market economies of the Soviet
Union and China manifested in contributions of the nascent entrepreneurial class to charity
or local public goods, which he sees as an attempt to alleviate destructive envy. Mui then
goes on to formally show how sharing can support the adoption of innovation in equilibrium.
Some authors (Schoeck, 1969; Ferna´ndez de la Mora, 1987) even see the modern progressive
taxation system as a remnant of “egalitarian envy.” Incidentally, using recent survey data
from 18 European countries, Clark and Senik (2010) showed that the strength of income
comparisons is associated with higher demand for redistribution.
Within the framework of section 3, a natural question is whether the rich would be
willing to share the fruits of their effort to avoid destructive envy and how this affects the
possible equilibrium outcomes of this modified envy game. Specifically, assume that Agent
2 can make a transfer to Agent 1 before stage 2 begins, as shown in Figure 8.
Consider the node of the game where the rich agent decides on transfer having seen
the outcomes of the investment stage. Obviously, non-zero transfer may only be optimal
if Y1 < τθY2, that is, destructive envy is binding. In this case Agent 2 may want to make
a positive transfer T to lower the intensity of destruction, d∗1.
Given that effort is sunk at this stage, Agent 2 maximizes
v(p∗2(T )(Y2 − T )− θ(1− d∗1(T ))(Y1 + T )) −→ max
T
s.t. 0 6 T 6 T¯ , (22)
where T¯ ≡ (τθY2 − Y1)/(1 + τθ) is the minimum transfer sufficient to completely avoid
destruction.20 Lemma 4 characterizes the optimal transfer of Agent 2.
20Formally, (1 − d∗1)Y1 − θp∗2Y2 is positive if and only if Y2/Y1 < (1 + τ)2/4τθ. Otherwise, U1 = −∞
and Agent 1 is indifferent between any feasible destruction intensities. For concreteness, focus on d∗1 as
the best response of Agent 1 in this case.
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Effort Li Outcomes Yi
Stage 1 (Investment, Transfer)
Production/Destruction di Consumption Ci Payoffs U
i
Stage 2 (Production, Destruction, Consumption)
Transfer T
Figure 8: Timing of events in the envy game with transfers.
Lemma 4. (Optimal transfer). For Y1/Y2 6 τθ, the optimal transfer is T = T¯ if and only
if τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ). Otherwise,
T =
{
T ∗, if Y1/Y2 < µ;
0, if Y1/Y2 > µ,
where T ∗ is given by the first-order condition of (22) for the interior solution and µ ∈ (0, τθ]
is a constant depending on τ and θ (see the Appendix).
In what follows consider the simple case τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ). Then, as established in
Lemma 4, it is always optimal for Agent 2 to make the full transfer T¯ . Intuitively, the rich
individual will be willing to do so if T¯ is low. The next lemma establishes what the best
response of Agent 2 looks like under full transfer.
Lemma 5. (BR of Agent 2 with full transfer). The best response function of Agent 2,
BRT2 ≡ Y ∗2 (Y1), has the following form:
Y ∗2 (Y1) =

K
1/σ
2 + θY1, if Y1 > Y˜1;
Y1 · 1τθ , if Y˘1 < Y1 < Y˜1;
(γ2K2)
1/σ − Y1, if Y1 6 Y˘1,
(23)
where
Y˜1 ≡ τθ
1− τθ2K
1/σ
2 , Y˘1 ≡
τθ
1 + τθ
(γ2K2)
1/σ, γ2 ≡
[
1− τθ2
1 + τθ
]1−σ
.
Now, instead of “destructive region” the best response of Agent 2 has a “transfer region”
(left panel of Figure 9). For low levels of Y1 it is optimal to prevent destruction through
transfers rather than by producing less in the first stage.
Agent 1 anticipates to get the full transfer in case of high inequality, because he knows
that the rich agent will be afraid of destructive envy. He takes this into account when
choosing his first period effort. Intuitively, given the high potential output of the rich,
Agent 1 has an incentive to invest as little effort as possible and cause a threat of destructive
envy thereby provoking the rich to make a transfer. Lemma 5 gives a characterization of
the best response function of Agent 1 for a special case that illustrates all possible kinds
of equilibria that can emerge in a modified envy game.
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Figure 9: Best responses in the envy game with transfers.
Lemma 6. (BR of Agent 1 with full transfer). Under parametric conditions (A12) and
(A13) provided in the Appendix the best response function of Agent 1, BRT1 ≡ Y ∗1 (Y2), is
given by
Y ∗1 (Y2) =

K
1/σ
1 + θY2, if Y2 6 Y˜2;
(γ1K1)
1/σ − Y2, if Y˜2 < Y2 < Y˘2;
0, if Y2 > Y˘2,
(24)
where
Y˜2 ≡ σ(γ
1/σ
1 − 1)
(σ − 1)(1 + θ)K
1/σ
1 , Y˘2 ≡ (γ1K1)1/σ, γ1 ≡
[
θ(τ − 1)
1 + τθ
]1−σ
.
The right panel of Figure 9 depicts this function. Note, in particular, that there is a
discontinuity at point Y˜2, as it becomes optimal for Agent 1 to switch to the KUJ-type
best response when Y2 is low enough.
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Given the best responses of the agents, two qualitatively different types of equilibria may
arise: fear equilibrium with transfers (FT) and KUJ equilibrium. Moreover, as shown in
the bottom panels of Figure 10, multiplicity of equilibria cannot be ruled out. Proposition
5 characterizes the equilibria under conditions of Lemma 6 and an additional restriction
that guarantees existence of at least one equilibrium for all possible values of k.
Proposition 5. (Equilibria of the envy game with transfers). Assume that ω < γ2/γ1,
where ω ≡ [σ(1− θ)(γ1/σ1 − 1)/(σ − 1)− θ]−σ. Then the envy game with transfers has: 1)
a unique KUJ equilibrium (16) if k > γ2/γ1; 2) a unique fear equilibrium with full transfer
21Under alternative parametric restrictions the best response of Agent 1 consists of only two regions,
KUJ and “zero output,” and a statement analogous to Proposition 5 holds.
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of the form
{Y FT1 , Y FT2 } = {0, (γ2K2)1/σ};
{CFT1 , CFT2 } = {ε(γ2K2)1/σ, (1− ε)(γ2K2)1/σ},
(25)
if k < ω, where ε ≡ [τθ/(1 + τθ)]; 3) two equilibria (16) and (25) if ω 6 k < γ2/γ1; 4)
multiple equilibria with full transfer of the form
{Y FT1 , Y FT2 } = {Y FT1 , (γ2K2)1/σ − Y FT1 }, 0 6 Y FT1 6 Y˜2;
{CFT1 , CFT2 } = {Y FT1 + T¯ , Y FT2 − T¯},
(26)
if k = γ2/γ1, along with a KUJ equilibrium.
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
KUJ
Y1
Y2
BRT1
FT
BRT2
BRT2
Y1
Y2
BRT1
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KUJ
Y1
Y2
BRT2
BRT1
FT
KUJ
Figure 10: Equilibria in the envy game with transfers.
Destructive and fear equilibria of the basic model are replaced by “fear equilibrium
with transfers,” in which the rich agent redistributes part of his investment outcome to
avoid destructive envy of the poor agent. Since inequality is what matters for the amount
of destruction, by investing nothing in the first stage the poor agent creates the fear of
envy forcing the rich to share. In turn, when the poor agent expects to receive a transfer,
he does not need to work hard and chooses to produce the minimum amount needed to
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create a credible threat to destroy. This type of equilibrium arises when initial inequality
is high. In contrast, if it is low, the only possible outcome of the game is the standard
KUJ equilibrium. It is easy to see that both γ2/γ1 and ω are increasing in τ and θ, that is,
reducing tolerance for inequality increases the likelihood of the redistributive equilibrium.
This is intuitive and parallels the taxonomy of equilibria in Proposition 1.
Interestingly, the possibility of transfers gives rise to (stable) multiple equilibria for
intermediate levels of inequality (bottom panels of Figure 10). This implies that societies
with similar characteristics and moderate wealth differences may end up in one of the two
alternative equilibria: one with redistribution and fear of destructive envy and the other
with KUJ-type competition. The following proposition highlights the contrast between the
two equilibria.
Proposition 6. Assume that ω < k < γ2/γ1, that is, the envy game with transfers
has an FT equilibrium (25) and a KUJ equilibrium (16). Then, the FT equilibrium is
characterized by: 1) higher ex-post inequality, that is, CFT1 /C
FT
2 < C
KUJ
1 /C
KUJ
2 ; 2) lower
total output, that is, Y FT2 < Y
KUJ. Moreover, 3) U2KUJ > U
2
FT, while U
1
KUJ > U
1
FT if and
only if (1− θ2)γ1γ(1−σ)/σ2 k > (σ − θ2)k1/σ + θ(σ − 1).
Curiously, the FT equilibrium is more unequal ex post than the KUJE. That is, com-
petitive envy turns out to be more effective in narrowing the gap between the rich and
the poor than redistribution under the threat of destructive envy. The second part of
Proposition 6 is intuitive. In the KUJE, positional externality makes both agents work
hard and leads to high total output. In FT equilibrium, the poor agent does not work at
all to create a threat of destructive envy, while the rich provides consumption for both.
Parts 1 and 2 help to understand the third statement. In the FT equilibrium, the poor
do not work and receive a transfer, just necessary to prevent destructive envy, while in the
KUJE they have to exert substantial effort in order to keep up with the rich. They prefer
the latter if the initial inequality is low enough, that is, k is large enough. In that case, ex-
post relative standing in the KUJE is good enough to justify extra effort. In the opposite
case, it is too hard to maintain the relative standing peacefully and the poor prefer to live
on transfers at the cost of lower social status. The rich, however, are always better off in
the KUJE: overworking due to positional externality in the KUJE dominates overworking
(and then sharing) under the threat of destructive envy in the FT equilibrium. Overall,
this result means that, if the two equilibria are in fact Pareto rankable, KUJ equilibrium
is dominant. Otherwise, there is a conflict of interests with the poor favoring the FT
equilibrium and the rich opting for the KUJE.
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6 Envy and the Dynamics of Inequality
So far, the analysis has focused on the equilibria of the static model in which inequality
of endowments was taken as fixed. In this section intergenerational links are introduced in
the basic model of section 3 to explore the dynamics of inequality driving the endogenous
evolution of the economy through different envy regimes.
Environment. The economy is populated by a sequence of non-overlapping genera-
tions, indexed by t > 0. Time is discrete, and each generation lives for one period. The
initial population consists of 2 homogeneous groups of people (representative agents), the
poor and the rich, with initial endowments K10 and K20 > K10. Each person has 1 child, so
that in each time period two groups of people are descendants of the two original groups.
Parents care about their children and leave bequests, bit, i = 1, 2, at the end of each period
t.22 In particular, they derive utility not just from relative consumption but the relative
Cobb-Douglas aggregator of consumption, now denoted cit, and bequest, bit:
U it =
pi(c1−αit b
α
it − θc1−αjt bαjt)1−σ
1− σ − Lit, (27)
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, 0 < α < 1 parameterizes the fraction of final output allocated to
bequest, and pi ≡ [(1−α)1−ααα]σ−1 is a normalization constant. Consumption and bequest
are made out of the final output, Cit, so that bit + cit = Cit. This formulation leaves the
workings of the basic model from section 3 intact while introducing dynamic linkages.
Dynamical system. The initial endowment of generation t+ 1, Kit+1, is assumed to
depend on the endowment of their parents and parental investment in children:
Kit+1 = K
β
itbit = K
β
itαCit, (28)
where i = 1, 2, and 0 < 1 − β < 1 is the rate of geometric depreciation of parental
endowment.23 Note that Proposition 1 holds each period t, and the level of initial inequality
in period t+ 1 is determined endogenously:
kt+1 ≡ K1t+1
K2t+1
= kβt ·
C1t
C2t
, (29)
given the initial condition 0 < k0 < 1. The joint dynamics of K1t and K2t depends on the
type of equilibrium, in which the economy resides, and the equilibrium next period is, in
22These bequests may represent any kind of investment in children that increases the productivity of
their effort, for example, expenditure on human capital.
23Persistence of endowments is introduced to make the dynamics more realistic. If β = 0, the qualitative
results remain unchanged, but the economy will not stay in the fear equilibrium for more than 1 period.
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turn, determined by the economic outcomes of the current period. Lemma 7 characterizes
this dynamical system and follows directly from Proposition 1 and the law of motion (28).
Lemma 7. (Dynamics of endowments). The two-dimensional dynamical system for K1t
and K2t is given by[
K1t+1
K2t+1
]
=

α
1−θ2 [K
β
1t(K
1/σ
1t + θK
1/σ
2t ), K
β
2t(K
1/σ
2t + θK
1/σ
1t )], if kt > k˜;
α
θ(τ−1) [τθK
1/σ+β
1t , K
β
2tK
1/σ
1t ], if kˆ 6 kt < k˜;
α[Kβ1t · CD1 (K1t, K2t), Kβ2t · CD2 (K1t, K2t)], if kt < kˆ,
(30)
where CD1 (K1t, K2t) and C
D
2 (K1t, K2t) are the final outputs in the DE given by (18).
The thresholds k˜ and kˆ divide the (K1t, K2t) phase plane into three regions according
to the types of equilibria (see Figures 11 and 12): KUJ, F (fear), and D (destruction). In
each of these regions the motion is governed by the corresponding part of the dynamical
system (30). To rule out explosive dynamics it is assumed throughout this section that
σ(1− β) > 1 which also implies that the results of all previous sections hold, since σ > 1.
It is convenient to analyze a companion one-dimensional difference equation driving the
dynamics of inequality. Some of its properties are established in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. (Dynamics of inequality). The dynamics of kt is given by
kt+1 =

g1(kt) ≡ [k1/σ+βt + θkβt ]/[1 + θk1/σt ], if kt > k˜;
g2(kt) ≡ τθkβt , if kˆ 6 kt < k˜;
g3(kt), if kt < kˆ,
(31)
where g3(kt) is implicitly given by
kt =
τ(1 + θ2)
2θ(1 + τ)2
· (zt+1 + θ)
2
zt+1
·
(
zt+1 − θ
1− θzt+1
)σ
, zt+1 ≡ kt+1/kβt . (32)
Moreover, kt+1 > kt for all 0 < kt < 1.
Further analysis focuses on the dynamics of the system in the fear region and the KUJ
region. The two lemmas below provide a characterization.
Lemma 9. (KUJ region dynamics). The system converges to a unique stable “equal”
long-run steady state K¯KUJ1 = K¯
KUJ
2 = K¯ = [α/(1− θ)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 . The steady-state levels of
output are equal to Y¯ KUJ1 = Y¯
KUJ
2 = Y¯ = K¯
1/σ/(1 − θ). The evolution of endowments is
determined by the loci
∆Ki ≡ Kit+1 −Kit = 0 : K1/σit + θK1/σjt = K1−βit · (1− θ2)/α, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
such that dKit/dKjt > 0 and d
2Kit/dK
2
jt < 0.
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Figure 11: Dynamics and steady states in the KUJ (left) and fear (right) regions.
Figure 11 (left panel) depicts schematically the dynamics in the KUJ region. The
descendants of the initially poor eventually catch up with the rich dynasty, and in the
steady state both have the same endowments.
Lemma 10. (Fear region dynamics). In the fear region the system moves towards a unique
stable “unequal” long-run steady state K¯1 = [ατ/(τ − 1)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 , K¯2 = K¯1 · (τθ)
1
β−1 . The
corresponding levels of output are Y¯1 = [τ/(τ − 1)]K¯1/σ1 and Y¯2 = K¯1/σ1 /[θ(τ − 1)]. This
steady state is, however, unattainable, since it is located in the KUJ region, that is, the
system moves to the KUJ region before reaching the fear steady state. The evolution of
endowments is determined by the loci
∆K1 = 0 : K1t = K¯1 = [ατ/(τ − 1)]
σ
σ(1−β)−1 ;
∆K2 = 0 : K1t = K
σ(1−β)
2t · [θ(τ − 1)/α]σ.
Figure 11 (right panel) depicts schematically the dynamics in the fear region. It is
instructive to look at the comparative statics of the long-run levels of output with respect
to τ and θ. They resemble the results of the static model: in the KUJ steady state, outputs
are increasing in θ and independent of τ ; in the (unattainable) fear steady state, the output
of group 1 is independent of θ and decreasing in τ while the output of group 2 is decreasing
in θ and τ . Note also that, despite their qualitatively different nature, as τθ → 1, the two
long-run equilibria get closer and coincide in the limit.
Given Lemmas 8–10, it is easy to establish how the possible development trajectories
look. The long-run convergence result is stated in Proposition 7 and depicted in Figure 12.
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Proposition 7. (Long-run convergence). Starting with any initial conditions {K10, K20},
such that 0 < k0 < 1, the endowments converge to a unique stable long-run “equal” steady
state of the KUJ region, K¯. Inequality decreases monotonically along the transition path.
K2t
K1t
k˜
kˆ
KUJ
F
D
S ′
S
Figure 12: Evolution through envy regimes.
Thus, if the economy starts off, say, in the destructive region, it experiences a transition
to the KUJ steady state, possibly passing through the fear region and staying there for a
while. Initially, destructive envy and the fear of it reduce original inequality of endowments
by discouraging productive effort of the rich or destroying part of their output. This leads to
more equal investment opportunities for future generations who eventually find it optimal
to compete productively. Envy-avoidance behavior, dictated by the destructive side of
envy, paves the way to emulation, driven by its competitive side.
The transitions from one envy region to another can be delayed or accelerated by factors
that affect the intensity of social comparisons, such as religion and ideology in general.24 In
the context of the model, religious and moral teachings condemning envy may be thought
of as causing downward pressure on θ. Assume that the economy is in the fear region and
θ falls. Then, as follows from Proposition 2, outputs will rise because the fear constraint of
24All major world religions denounce envy. In Judeo-Christian tradition envy is one of the deadly sins
and features prominently in the tenth commandment. Schoeck (1969, p. 160) goes as far as to say that “a
society from which all cause of envy had disappeared would not need the moral message of Christianity.”
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Figure 13: Dynamics of inequality under low (left) and high (right) τ .
the rich is alleviated permitting higher effort without fear of destructive envy. Moreover,
as follows directly from (19), a fall in θ lowers the inequality threshold k˜ contributing to a
faster transition from FE to KUJE. As the economy enters the KUJ region, destructive envy
turns into emulation, and changes in θ have an opposite impact on economic performance.
In the KUJ region the same factors that drive the society out of the fear equilibrium by
reducing the strength of envy have a negative effect on output.
An example of an ideology affecting θ is that of material egalitarianism. The concept
of everyone being equal and the neglect of private property rights are effective in fostering
social comparisons and lowering tolerance for inequality. Hence, this ideology operates in
favor of the destructive side of envy and delays the transition to the KUJE.
Similarly, one could analyze the dynamic effects of a shock in τ that could be due to
a variety of reasons, from changes in technologies of destruction and protection to reforms
of legal institutions. If τ increases, it can be shown that: 1) the threshold k˜ increases;
2) the scope of the fear region, (k˜ − kˆ), extends; 3) the long-run fear steady state moves
closer to the long-run KUJ steady state. So, an increase in τ would endogenously prolong
the presence of the economy in the fear region (see Figure 13), and at the same time
would make the FE more egalitarian since the erosion of institutions decreases tolerance
for inequality and exacerbates the fear constraint. This may explain the persistence of
the fear equilibrium, along with such characteristics as poorly protected private property
rights, fear of envy, and relatively low inequality.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a unified framework for the economic analysis of envy by capturing its
two main forces, destructive and competitive. The role of envy in society is determined in
equilibrium by the level of fundamental inequality and the endogenous tolerance threshold
shaped by the quality of institutions and the strength of positional concerns.
The qualitatively different equilibria that arise in this framework are broadly consistent
with the available evidence on the implications of envy for economic incentives. The
“keeping up with the Joneses” equilibrium roughly corresponds to modern economies, in
which emulation is the main driver of consumer demand. The “fear equilibrium” resembles
the role of envy in developing countries, where the fear of envious retaliation prevents
productive investment and retards progress. The different nature of these equilibria yields
contrasting comparative statics with respect to the strength of positional concerns. In the
KUJ equilibrium, envy enhances production by intensifying emulation, while in the fear
equilibrium it reduces output by aggravating the fear constraint.
The model sheds new light on the interplay between institutions, welfare, and economic
performance. First, while better institutions can move the society from the low-output
fear equilibrium to the high-output KUJ equilibrium, such change need not be welfare
enhancing if it triggers the “rat race” competition. Second, transfers can be used to avoid
envy-motivated destruction in equilibrium, which is in line with the evidence on the role
of redistributive mechanisms in developing societies.
A dynamic extension of the model explores the evolution of the economy through differ-
ent envy regimes. Starting at any initial conditions, the economy converges to the long-run
KUJ steady state, driven by the decline of inequality along the transition path. This tran-
sition can be delayed or accelerated by factors that affect the strength of social comparisons
and the relative attractiveness of productive and destructive effort.
This paper lays a foundation for understanding the changing role of envy in the process
of development. This line of research is pursued in Gershman (2011b) by incorporating
the basic model in a simple endogenous growth framework, in which resources are lim-
ited and productivity is driven by learning-by-doing and knowledge spillovers. As rising
productivity expands the production possibilities frontier for everyone, the society experi-
ences an endogenous transition from the fear equilibrium to the KUJ equilibrium causing
a qualitative change in the relationship between envy and economic performance.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. As follows from (7), d∗2 = 0 iff Y2/Y1 > τθ(1 − d1)(1 + τd1). This clearly holds, if
d1 = 0, since τθ < 1 and Y2 > Y1. If d1 = (
√
τθY2/Y1 − 1)/τ > 0, the above inequality is equivalent to√
Y2
Y1
> θ(1 + τ)
√
τθ
1 + τθ2
.
Since Y2 > Y1, this holds, if the right-hand side is less or equal than unity, that is, θ
√
τθ 6 (1+τθ2)/(1+τ).
Since τ < 1/θ, sup{θ√τθ} = inf{(1 + τθ2)/(1 + τ)} = θ. Hence, θ√τθ 6 (1 + τθ2)/(1 + τ), given that
τθ < 1 and Y2 > Y1, and Lemma 1 gives the unique second-stage equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. Agent 2 is solving (10) subject to (8) and (9). Consider first the case τθY2 6 Y1, in
which d∗1 = 0 and
U2 =
(Y2 − θY1)1−σ
1− σ −
Y2
K2
.
It is strictly concave in Y2, and the first-order conditions yield the following optimum:
Y2 =
{
K
1/σ
2 + θY1, if Y1 > C˜1;
Y1 · 1τθ , if Y1 < C˜1,
(A1)
where C˜1 is defined in Lemma 2. That is, the left derivative of U
2 at point Y2 = Y1/τθ is positive (negative)
iff Y1 < C˜1 (Y1 > C˜1). Next, consider the destructive case, τθY2 > Y1, in which, as follows from (8)-(10),
U2 =
1
1− σ ·
(√
Y1Y2
τθ
· (1 + θ2)− θ(τ + 1)
τ
Y1
)1−σ
− Y2
K2
.
Again, U2 is strictly concave in Y2, and the interior optimum is uniquely defined by the first-order condition(√
Y1Y2
τθ
· (1 + θ2)− θ(τ + 1)
τ
Y1
)−σ
·
(
1 + θ2
2
√
τθ
·
√
Y1
Y2
)
− 1
K2
= 0. (A2)
It follows that the right derivative of U2 at point Y2 = Y1/τθ is positive (negative) iff Y1 < Ĉ1 (Y1 > Ĉ1),
where Ĉ1 is defined in Lemma 2 and Ĉ1 < C˜1, since 0 < θ < 1. Hence, allowing destruction is the best
response iff Y1 < Ĉ1.
To rewrite (A2) in terms of consumption note that if destruction takes place
C1 = (1− d∗1)Y1 =
1 + τ
τ
Y1 −
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2;
C2 = p
∗
2Y2 =
√
Y1Y2
τθ
.
=⇒

Y1 =
1 + τ
τ
(C1 + θC2);
Y2 = θ(1 + τ) · C
2
2
C1 + θC2
.
(A3)
Substituting this into (A2) yields (12). Next, applying the implicit function theorem to (12) gives
dC2
dC1
=
θ + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2
1 + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2 · C1C2
> 0, (A4)
since the optimal response requires C2 > θC1. The latter also implies that dC2/dC1 < C2/C1. Finally,
d2C2
dC21
=
(
σ +
C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
· C1
C2
)−1
· C2 − C1 ·
dC2
dC1
C2(C1 + θC2)
·
 (1 + θ2)
(
C1
dC2
dC1
− C2
)
C1 + θC2
−
dC2
dC1
(C2 − θC1)
C2
 < 0,
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since C2 > θC1 and 0 < dC2/dC1 < C2/C1. Hence, C
d
2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave.
Proof of Lemma 3. Agent 1 is solving (13) subject to (8) and (9). In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1,
U1 =
(Y1 − θY2)1−σ
1− σ −
Y1
K1
.
It is strictly concave in Y1, and the first-order conditions yield the following optimum:
Y1 =
{
K
1/σ
1 + θY2, if Y2 6 Ĉ2;
τθY2, if Y2 > Ĉ2,
(A5)
where Ĉ2 is defined in Lemma 3. In the destructive case, τθY2 > Y1, expressions (8), (9), and (13) yield
U1 =
1
1− σ ·
(
1 + τ
τ
Y1 − 2
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2
)1−σ
− Y1
K1
.
Assumption σ > 1 is sufficient for U1 to be strictly concave in Y1. In particular, it can be shown by simple
differentiation that the sign of d2U1/dY 21 coincides with the sign of h(x) ≡ −(1+σ)x2+ξ(2σ+1/2)x−σξ2,
where x ≡ √θY2/τY1 and ξ ≡ (τ + 1)/τ . Then, it is easy to show that hmax ∝ 1 − 8σ < 0 and so, U1 is
concave under σ > 1.
Note that U1 is differentiable at point Y1 = τθY2 with dU
1(τθY2)/dY1 = ((τ − 1)θY2)−σ − 1/K1.
Hence, there are only two cases. If Y2 6 Ĉ2, the global optimum is given by the interior optimum in the
KUJ region. If Y2 > Ĉ2, there global optimum is in the destructive region and it is given by the first-order
condition (
1 + τ
τ
Y1 − 2
√
θ
τ
Y1Y2
)−σ
·
(
1 + τ
τ
−
√
θ
τ
· Y2
Y1
)
− 1
K1
= 0. (A6)
Finally, using (A3) rewrite equation (A6) in terms of consumption levels to get (15). Applying the implicit
function theorem to (15) gives
dC1
dC2
=
θ − θσ · C1−θC2C1+θC2
1− θσ · C1−θC2C1+θC2 · C2C1
> 0, (A7)
since σ > 1 and the optimal response requires C1 > θC2. The latter also implies that dC1/dC2 < C1/C2.
Finally,
d2C1
dC22
=
θ
σ
(
1− θ
σ
· C1 − θC2
C1 + θC2
· C2
C1
)−1 θ
(
dC1
dC2
· C2C1 − 1
)2
C1 + θC2
+
(C1 − θC2)
(
dC1
dC2
+ θ
)(
1− dC1dC2 · C2C1
)
(C1 + θC2)2
 > 0,
since σ > 1, C1 > θC2, and dC1/dC2 < C1/C2. Hence, C
d
1 (C2) is strictly increasing and convex.
Proof of Proposition 1. Private outputs in the KUJ equilibrium are given by (16). For this to be an
equilibrium two conditions must hold: Y KUJ1 > C˜1 and Y KUJ2 6 Ĉ2. This yields k > k˜, where k˜ is defined
in Proposition 1. In the fear equilibrium private outputs are given by (17). For Y F2 to be the best response
of Agent 2 it must be the case that Ĉ1 6 Y F1 < C˜1, which yields kˆ 6 k < k˜ with kˆ defined in Proposition
1. The borderline fear equilibrium happens when τθĈ2 = Ĉ1, that is, when k = kˆ. If τθĈ2 < Ĉ1, that
is, k < kˆ, the only possibility is the destructive equilibrium. To prove its existence note that: 1) from
Lemma 2, Cd2 (C1) is strictly increasing and concave which implies that C
d
2 (C
d
1 (Ĉ2)) > Ĉ2; 2) from Lemma
32
3, Cd1 (C2) is strictly increasing and convex which implies that the inverse of C
d
1 at point Ĉ1 is greater than
Cd2 (Ĉ1) = Ĉ1/τθ. Hence, the intermediate value theorem guarantees existence of a destructive equilibrium
(CD1 , C
D
2 ) such that C
D
1 < Ĉ1 and C
D
2 > Ĉ2. Finally, direct comparison of (A4) and (A7) shows that the
slope of the inverse of Cd1 is always steeper than that of C
d
2 , which ensures single crossing.
Proof of Proposition 2. Results for the KUJE and the FE follow directly from (16) and (17). For the
DE, consider the system defining the equilibrium:{
f1 ≡ C1 − θC2 − ψ[C1/(C1 + θC2)]1/σ = 0;
f2 ≡ C2 − θC1 − φ[(C1 + θC2)/C2]1/σ = 0.
Using the equilibrium conditions, it can be shown that
[DCf ]
−1 =
1
∆
[
1 + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2 · C1C2 θ − θσ · C1−θC2C1+θC2
θ + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2 1− θσ · C1−θC2C1+θC2 · C2C1
]
,
where C is the vector of consumption levels, f is the vector of f1 and f2, and ∆ ≡ det(DCf) = 1 −
θ2 + [(C1 − θC2)2(C2 − θC1)]/[σ(C1 + θC2)C1C2] > 0. It follows from this expression that all elements of
[DCf ]
−1 are positive since σ > 1 and θC1 < C2 < C1/θ in equilibrium.
For part (a), note that, by the implicit function theorem, DλC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dλf and
Dλf = −
[
ψλ
ψ (C1 − θC2)
φλ
φ (C2 − θC1)
]
=
1
σ
[
− 1λ (C1 − θC2)
1
1−λ (C2 − θC1)
]
.
It follows that the sign of ∂C1/∂λ coincides with the sign of[
1 +
1
σ
· C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
· C1
C2
]
(C1 − θC2)− θλ
1− λ ·
[
1− 1
σ
· C1 − θC2
C1 + θC2
]
(C2 − θC1).
Dividing (12) by (15) and denoting x ≡ C1/C2 ∈ (θ, 1), in equilibrium we have
λ
1− λ =
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ
· τ(1 + θ
2)
2θ(1 + τ)2
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
Plugging this expression in the previous equation and making transformations, we get
σ(θ + x) + x(1− θx)
σ(θ + x)− (x− θ) −
τ(1 + θ2)
2(1 + τ)2
·
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ−1
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
The first term is always greater than 1. The second term is increasing in x and at x = 1 simplifies to
τ(1 + θ2)(1 + θ)2/[2(1 + τ)2]. The latter expression is maximized at τ = 1 in which case it is equal to
(1 + θ2)(1 + θ)2/4 6 1 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the second term is always less than 1 and ∂C1/∂λ > 0.
Although the sign of ∂C2/∂λ is ambiguous, the sign of ∂C/∂λ can be determined, as it coincides with
the sign of
σ(1 + θ)(x+ θ) + (1− θx)(1 + x)
σ(1 + θ)(x+ θ)− θ(x− θ)(1 + 1/x) −
τ(1 + θ2)
2(1 + τ)2
·
(
x− θ
1− θx
)σ−1
· (x+ θ)
2
x
.
As above, the first term of this expression is always greater than 1, while the second is always less than 1.
Hence, ∂C/∂λ > 0.
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For part (b), note that DθC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dθf and
Dθf = −
 C2 · ( 1σ · C1−θC2C1+θC2 − 1)
−C1 + 1σ · C2−θC1C1+θC2 ·
(1−θ2)C1−2θ3C2
θ(1+θ2)
 .
It follows that the sign of ∂C1/∂θ is determined by the sign of
C2 + θC1 − 1
σ
C2 − θC1
C1 + θC2
(
(1− θ2)C1 − 2θ3C2
1 + θ2
− C1
)
.
Since (1 − θ2)C1 − 2θ3C2 − (1 + θ2)C1 = −2θ2C1 − 2θ3C2 < 0, we get ∂C1/∂θ > 0. As discussed in the
main text, the sign of ∂C2/∂θ is generally ambiguous.
For part (c), note that DτC = −[DCf ]−1 ·Dτf and
Dτf = −
[
ψτ
ψ (C1 − θC2)
φτ
φ (C2 − θC1)
]
with both elements positive, since ψτ < 0 and φτ < 0. It follows that the elements of DτC are negative
meaning that C1 and C2 are decreasing in τ .
Proof of Proposition 3. As follows from (17), the utilities in the FE are given by
U1F =
(
1
1− σ −
τ
τ − 1
)
K
1−σ
σ
1 , U
2
F =
(
1
1− σ ·
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]1−σ
− 1
θ(τ − 1) ·
K1
K2
)
K
1−σ
σ
1 . (A8)
In the KUJE, as follows from (16), they are
U iKUJ =
(
1
1− σ −
1
1− θ2
)
·K
1−σ
σ
i −
θ
1− θ2 ·
K
1
σ
j
Ki
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (A9)
For Agent 1, U1KUJ < U
1
F iff k < [θ(τ − 1)/(1− τθ2)]σ which, as shown in Proposition 1, is always true in
the FE. For Agent 2, U2KUJ < U
2
F iff[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1) ·
1
1− θ2
]
k < − 1
σ − 1 ·
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]1−σ
+
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
1− θ2
)
k
σ−1
σ . (A10)
Let L(k) and R(k) denote the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A10), respectively. Note that: 1)
R(k) is strictly increasing and concave, 2) L(k˜) = R(k˜), and 3) L′(k˜) > R′(k˜). Hence, either L(k) < R(k)
∀k ∈ (kˆ, k˜) or ∃! k¯ ∈ (kˆ, k˜), such that L(k) < R(k) iff k > k¯. The former is true iff L(kˆ) < R(kˆ) which
boils down to the condition(
1
1− θ2 +
1
σ − 1
)(
1 + θ2
2
)σ−1
σ
− 1
σ − 1 −
1 + θ2
2(1− θ2) > 0.
Let z ≡ (1 + θ2)/2 ∈ (1/2, 1) and a ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). Then, after re-arranging this condition becomes
g(z) ≡ [a+ 2(1− a)(1− z)]za + (2− 3a)z − 2(1− a) > 0.
Note that: 1) g(1/2) = (1/2)a + a/2 − 1 < 0 since it is strictly convex in a on the (0, 1) interval and is
equal to zero at its endpoints, 2) g(1) = 0, 3) g′(1) = a(a−1) < 0, and 4) g′′(z) < 0. Hence ∃! z¯ ∈ (1/2, 1),
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such that g(z) > 0 iff z > z¯. This implies that ∃! θ¯ ∈ (0, 1), such that L(k) < R(k) (and thus, U2KUJ < U2F)
∀k ∈ (kˆ, k˜) iff θ > θ¯. If θ < θ¯, ∃! k¯ ∈ (kˆ, k˜), such that U2KUJ < U2F iff k > k¯, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows immediately from (A8) that dU1F/dk > 0 since K1 = λK = kK/(1+k).
As for Agent 2,
U2F =
(
1
1− σ ·
[
1− τθ2
θ(τ − 1)
]1−σ
− 1
θ(τ − 1) · k
)(
k
1 + k
) 1−σ
σ
K
1−σ
σ .
Differentiating with respect to k and re-arranging terms we obtain that dU2F/dk > 0 iff h(k) ≡ σk2+k−δ <
0, where δ is defined in Proposition 4. Next, h(kˆ) > 0 iff
σ
(
1 + θ2
2
)2σ [
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]σ
+
1 + θ2
2
> 1− τθ2.
If the above condition holds, h(k) > 0 and hence, dU2F/dk < 0 ∀k ∈ (kˆ, k˜). Otherwise ∃! k∗, such that
h(k∗) = 0, namely k∗ = (
√
1 + 4σδ−1)/2σ. Moreover, k∗ < k˜ since h(k˜) ∝ σ[θ(τ−1)/(1−τθ2)]σ+τθ2 > 0.
Finally (A9) can be re-written in terms of k as
U1KUJ = −
(
kK
1 + k
) 1−σ
σ
·
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
1− θ2 +
θ
1− θ2 ·
1
k
)
;
U2KUJ = −
(
K
1 + k
) 1−σ
σ
·
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
1− θ2 +
θ
1− θ2 · k
1
σ
)
,
which implies that dU1KUJ/dk > 0 and dU
2
KUJ/dk < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (8) and (9), rewrite (22) as
v
(
(1 + θ2)
√
(Y1 + T )(Y2 − T )
τθ
− θ(τ + 1)
τ
(Y1 + T )
)
−→ max
T
s.t. 0 6 T 6 T¯ .
The objective function is strictly concave in T . The first-order condition for interior solution, T ∗, is
1 + θ2
2
√
τθ
· Y2 − Y1 − 2T
∗√
(Y1 + T ∗)(Y2 − T ∗)
=
θ(τ + 1)
τ
, 0 < T ∗ < T¯ .
It is straightforward to check that v′(T¯ ) > 0 iff τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ) which is the condition for full transfer.
On the other hand, v′(0) < 0 iff [(1 + θ2)/2
√
τθ](1− x2) < x[θ(τ + 1)/τ ], where x ≡√Y1/Y2. Solving this
inequality yields the condition Y1/Y2 > µ, where
√
µ ≡ [√τ2(1 + θ2)2 + θ2(τ + 1)2τθ−θ(τ+1)√τθ]/[τ(1+
θ2)], and 0 < µ 6 τθ if τθ 6 (1− θ)/(1 + θ).
Proof of Lemma 5. In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1, as established in the proof of Lemma 2, the optimal
action of Agent 2 is (A1). In the case with full transfer, p∗2 = 1, d
∗
1 = 0, Y2 − T¯ = (Y1 + Y2)/(1 + τθ),
Y1 + T¯ = τθ(Y1 + Y2)/(1 + τθ), and so, the utility function of Agent 2 is given by
U2 =
γ2(Y1 + Y2)
1−σ
1− σ −
Y2
K2
,
where γ2 is defined in Lemma 5. It is strictly concave in Y2 and the unique optimum is given by Y2 =
(γ2K2)
1/σ − Y1, which is interior iff Y1 < Y˘1, where Y˘1 is defined in Lemma 5, and Y˘1 < Y˜1, as direct
comparison shows. This yields (23).
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Proof of Lemma 6. In the KUJ case, τθY2 6 Y1, as established in the proof of Lemma 3, the optimal
action of Agent 1 is (A5). Now consider the case in which Agent 2 makes a full transfer under a credible
threat of destruction, τθY2 > Y1. The utility of Agent 1 is
U1 =
γ1(Y1 + Y2)
1−σ
1− σ −
Y1
K1
,
where γ1 is defined in Lemma 5. This yields the following solution:
Y1 =

b1 ≡ τθY2, if Y2 < Y˘2/(1 + τθ);
b2 ≡ (γ1K1)1/σ − Y2, if Y˘2/(1 + τθ) 6 Y2 < Y˘2;
b3 ≡ 0, if Y2 > Y˘2,
(A11)
where Y˘2 is defined in Lemma 5. First, note that if the optimum is not interior in the KUJ region,
that is, if Y2 > Ĉ2, the global optimum is determined by (A11) since the left derivative of U
1 at point
Y1 = τθY2 is less than the right derivative. In particular, dU
1(τθY2
−)/dY1 = γ1(1 + τθ)−σY −σ2 − 1/K1,
while dU1(τθY2
+)/dY1 = (τθY2 − θY2)−σ − 1/K1, and, after re-arrangement, the former is smaller than
the latter iff γ1 < [(1 + τθ)/θ(τ − 1)]σ which always holds since θ(τ − 1) < 1 + τθ.
Consider for concreteness only the case Y˘2 < Ĉ2 (the other case can be analyzed in exactly the same
way) which holds if
γ
1/σ
1 <
1
θ(τ − 1) . (A12)
Then, as follows from (A11), Y2 > Ĉ2 implies that the best response will be b3. If, however, Y2 < Ĉ2,
the optimum in the KUJ region is interior and needs to be compared to the best response in the transfer
region. In the former case
U1KUJ =
σ
1− σK
1−σ
σ
1 −
θY2
K1
.
If Y˘2 6 Y2 < Ĉ2, b3 is the best response in the transfer region and the corresponding utility is
U1FT =
γ2Y
1−σ
2
1− σ .
Then, it is easy to show that U1FT > U
1
KUJ in the region Y˘2 6 Y2 < Ĉ2 if the following condition holds:
[1− θ(σ − 1)]γ1/σ1 < σ. (A13)
In particular, U1FT > U
1
KUJ iff
γ1Y
1−σ
2
σ − 1 −
θY2
K1
<
σ
σ − 1K
1−σ
σ
1 .
The left-hand side of this expression, L(Y2) is strictly decreasing in Y2, which implies that the above
inequality always holds in the region Y˘2 6 Y2 < Ĉ2 if it holds at point Y2 = Y˘2. The latter yields condition
(A13). Assume that it holds along with (A12), in which case Y1 = 0 is the best response for Y2 > Y˘2.
Next, consider the region Y˘2/(1 + τθ) 6 Y2 < Y˘2, in which b2 is the best response in the case with
transfer and the corresponding utility is
U1FT =
σ
1− σγ
1/σ
1 K
1−σ
σ
1 +
Y2
K1
.
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Since (A13) holds and KUJ optimum is interior (that is, b1 cannot be a best response) it must be the case
that in this region there exists a value of Y2 such that U
1
FT = U
1
KUJ. Direct computation shows that this
value is Y˜2, as defined in Lemma 5, where Y˘2/(1 + τθ) < Y˜2 < Y˘2. So, the global optimum is the KUJ best
response, if Y2 6 Y˜2, and b2, otherwise. Putting everything together yields the statement of Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. For (16) to be an equilibrium, as follows from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, the
following conditions must hold: Y KUJ1 > Y˜1 and Y KUJ2 6 Y˜2. The former yields the condition k >
(γ2/γ1)
σ/(σ−1), while the latter leads to k > ω. As follows from the lemmas below, ω is well-defined and
exceeds (γ2/γ1)
σ/(σ−1), that is, a KUJ equilibrium exists iff k > ω.
Lemma A. Under the full transfer condition, τθ 6 (1 − θ)/(1 + θ), the parameter ω is well-defined,
that is, σ(1 − γ1/σ1 )(1 − θ) > θ(σ − 1). The latter can be re-arranged as (σ − θ)/(1 − θ) < σγ1/σ1 . Define
a ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the preceding inequality turns into
1− θ(1− a)
1− θ <
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
.
The left-hand side of this expression, L(a), is linear in a, with L(0) = 1, L(1) = 1 − θ, and L′(0) =
θ/(1 − θ). The right-hand side, R(a), is strictly increasing and convex in a, with R(0) = 1 = L(0),
R(1) = (1+ τθ)/(θ(τ −1)) > L(1), and R′(0) = ln[(1+ τθ)/θ(τ −1)]. Note that R′(0) is strictly decreasing
in τ and, hence, under the full-transfer assumption τ < [1− θ]/[θ(1 + θ)], inf R′(0) = ln[2/(1− 2θ − θ2)].
The latter is well-defined since θ <
√
2−1, as follows from the full-transfer assumption together with τ > 1.
Finally, ln[2/(1− 2θ− θ2)] monotonically increases in θ on the segment [0,√2− 1], with a minimum value
ln 2 at θ = 0, while L′(0) is monotonically increasing with supL′(0) = 1/
√
2 < ln 2. Hence, L′(0) < R′(0)
for all a ∈ (0, 1) and, given the other properties outlined in the lemma, L(a) < R(a) for all a ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, ω is well-defined.
Lemma B. It is always true that ω > (γ2/γ1)
σ/(σ−1). Given the definitions of ω, γ1, and γ2, as well as
a from Lemma A, this inequality can be re-written as[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
< 1 +
a(1 + θ)
θ(τ − 1) .
The left-hand side is a strictly increasing convex function of a, while the right-hand side is linear in a.
Moreover, the two parts coincide at the endpoint of the [0, 1] segment. It follows that the above inequality
holds for all a ∈ (0, 1).
For (25) to be an equilibrium the following conditions must hold: Y FT1 6 Y˘1 and Y FT2 > Y˘2. The
former is always true, while the latter yields the condition k 6 γ2/γ1. It follows that FT and KUJ
equilibria coexist iff ω 6 k 6 γ2/γ1, where ω < γ2/γ1 is the existence assumption. If k = γ2/γ1, the
best-response functions partially overlap yielding a continuum of equilibria.
Finally, it can be shown that the fear equilibrium without transfers (as in the basic model) does not
exist. For (17) to be an equilibrium, condition Y F2 = Ĉ2 6 Y˜2 must be satisfied, but restriction (A12) rules
this out since Y˜2 < Y˘2 < Ĉ2. Putting everything together yields the statement of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6. It follows from (16) and (25) that
CKUJ1
CKUJ2
=
k1/σ + θ
1 + θk1/σ
,
CFT1
CFT2
= τθ.
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Then, inequality is higher in FT equilibrium iff k > [(1 − τθ2)/θ(τ − 1)]−σ, and it is sufficient to show
that ω > [(1 − τθ2)/θ(τ − 1)]−σ to prove part 1. From definition of ω and after re-arrangement, the
latter holds iff (1 + θ)/[θ(τ − 1)] > σ(γ1/σ1 − 1)/(σ − 1). Denote the right-hand side of this inequality as
L(a) ≡ ([(1 + τθ)/θ(τ − 1)]a − 1)/a, where a ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). This function is strictly increasing if
L′(a) > 0, which holds iff
q(a) ≡
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
·
(
a ln
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]
− 1
)
+ 1 > 0.
The function q(a) is strictly increasing since
q′(a) = a
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
· ln2
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]
> 0.
Hence, inf q = lima→0 q(a) = 0. This implies that L′(a) > 0. Furthermore, lima→1 L(a) = (1+θ)/[θ(τ−1)],
which completes the proof of part 1.
It follows from (16) and (25) that Y KUJ > Y FT2 iff (k
1/σ + 1)/(1− θ) > γ1/σ2 . Since k > ω,
k1/σ + 1
1− θ >
ω1/σ + 1
1− θ =
σγ
1/σ
1 − 1
σ(γ
1/σ
1 − 1)− θ(σγ1/σ1 − 1)
.
As can be easily shown, the right-hand side of this expression exceeds γ
1/σ
2 iff 1− θ < h(a), where
h(a) ≡ 1
1 + L(a)
+
[
1− τθ2
1 + τθ
]a
and f(a) is defined as above. Since L′(a) > 0, h′(a) < 0. Furthermore, lima→1 h(a) = 1 − θ, completing
the proof of part 2.
As follows from (2), (5), and Proposition 5, in the FT equilibrium the utilities of agents are given by:
U1FT =
γ1(γ2K2)
1−σ
σ
1− σ , U
2
FT =
σγ
1/σ
2 K
1−σ
σ
2
1− σ .
In the KUJ equilibrium they are given by (A9). Direct comparison shows that U1KUJ > U
1
FT iff (1 −
θ2)γ1γ
(1−σ)/σ
2 k > (σ− θ2)k1/σ + θ(σ− 1), which is the condition in Proposition 6. Similarly, U2KUJ > U2FT
iff
k1/σ <
σγ
1/σ
2 − 1
σ − 1 ·
1− θ2
θ
− 1
θ
.
Since the left-hand side is strictly increasing in k, it is sufficient to prove that the above inequality holds
at k = γ2/γ1 to establish that it holds ∀k ∈ (ω, γ2/γ1). After re-arranging the terms, at k = γ2/γ1 the
inequality takes the form
aθ2 + (1− θ2) <
[
1 + τθ
1− τθ2
]a
− aθ
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]a
.
Denote the right-hand side of this inequality as R(a). Then, R′(a) > 0 iff
q(a) ≡
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
ln
[
1 + τθ
1− τθ2
]
− θa ln
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]
− θ > 0.
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The function q(a) is strictly increasing since
q′(a) =
[
1 + τθ
θ(τ − 1)
]a
ln2
[
1 + τθ
1− τθ2
]
− θ ln
[
θ(τ − 1)
1− τθ2
]
> 0,
as θ(τ − 1)/(1 − τθ2) < 1. Hence, inf R = lima→0R(a) = ln[(1 + τθ)/(1 − τθ2)] − θ > 0. The latter
inequality holds because: 1) ln[(1+τθ)/(1−τθ2)]−θ > ln[1/(1−θ)]−θ, since τ > 1, and 2) ln[1/(1−θ)] is
a strictly convex function in θ with the slope of 1 at θ = 0, that is, it always lies above θ. Hence, R′(a) > 0.
Furthermore, inf R = lima→0R(a) = 1, while sup{aθ2 + 1− θ2} = 1, which completes the proof of part 3.
Proof of Lemma 8. The functional forms of gi(kt), i = 1, 2, follow directly from (16), (17), and
(29). The form of g3(kt) follows from (12), (15) and (29). Next, it is straightforward to establish by
differentiation that g1(k) and g2(k) are strictly increasing and concave, given that β < 1 and σ(1−β) > 1.
Furthermore, 1) g1(1) = 1, 2) g1(k˜) = g2(k˜) > k˜, and 3) g2(kˆ) = g3(kˆ) > kˆ. The second property holds
iff τθ > (k˜)1−β = [θ(τ − 1)/(1 − τθ2)]σ(1−β) which is always trues since τθ > θ(τ − 1)/(1 − τθ2) and
σ(1 − β) > 1. The third property holds iff τθ > (kˆ)1−β which is always true, as follows from property 2
and the fact that kˆ < k˜. Together these properties imply that kt+1 > kt for kt > kˆ.
Finally, if there exists a steady state k¯ in the destructive segment, it is given by g3(k¯) = k¯. Making a
substitution κ = k¯1−β and rearranging terms yields the equation defining the steady state:
κ2−β
(κ+ θ)2(1−β)
= χ
(
κ− θ
1− θκ
)σ(1−β)
, (A14)
where χ ≡ [τ(1 + θ2)/2θ(1 + τ)2]1−β and in equilibrium κ > θ. It is easy to show that R(κ), the right-
hand side of (A14), is strictly increasing and convex. Also, L(κ), the left-hand side of (A14), is strictly
increasing. To show that it is concave for κ > θ, note that the sign of L′′(κ) is determined by the sign of
L˜(κ) ≡ (κ+ θ)(2−β)(βκ+ θ(1−β))−κ(3−2β)(βκ+ θ(2−β)). At κ = θ this expression is negative, since
β < 1. Moreover, it is strictly decreasing for the same reason. Hence, L′′(κ) < 0 for κ > θ. This implies
that there exists at most one solution to (A14). If there is no solution, the proof is finished. Assume
now that k¯ exists. In this case k¯ > kˆ. To see this, note first that kˆ < (τθ)1/(1−β). Next, κ > τθ since
L(τθ) > R(τθ). Hence, k¯ ≡ κ1/(1−β) > (τθ)1/(1−β) > kˆ, that is, kt+1 > kt for 0 < kt < kˆ.
Proof of Lemma 9. It follows from the properties of g1(kt) that kt monotonically converges to 1
in the KUJ region. The expression for ∆Ki = 0 comes from (30) and may be rewritten as Kjt =
Kit[(ρK
1−β−1/σ
it − 1)/θ]σ, where ρ ≡ (1 − θ2)/α. Then, by differentiation we get that dKjt/dKit > 0
and d2Kjt/dK
2
it > 0, since σ(1 − β) > 1. This implies the stated properties of the ∆Ki = 0 loci. The
expression for K¯ follows from solving ∆K1 = ∆K2 = 0 and (16) then gives Y¯ .
Proof of Lemma 10. The equations for ∆Ki = 0 come from (30). Since in the fear region K1t+1 =
ατK
1/σ+β
1t /(τ − 1) and σ(1 − β) > 1, K1t converges to K¯1. Plugging this in ∆K2 = 0 yields K¯2. The
output levels follow from (17). To see that the long-run fear equilibrium is in the KUJ region, note that
the implied steady-state level of inequality is [τθ]1/(1−β) which exceeds k˜ = [θ(τ − 1)/(1 − τθ2)]σ, since
σ(1− β) > 1 and θ(τ − 1)/(1− τθ2) < τθ < 1.
39
Equilibria in the model with symmetric destruction opportunities. As mentioned in section 3,
the assumption about “predator and prey” relationship between Agent 1 and Agent 2 is without loss of
generality. Combining the proofs of lemmas 2 and 3 we get that in the general case the best responses of
both agents are symmetric and have the following form:
C∗i (Cj) =

C¯di (Cj), if Cj > C˘j ;
K
1/σ
i + θCj , if C˜j < Cj 6 C˘j ;
Cj · 1τθ , if Ĉj 6 Cj < C˜j ;
Cdi (Cj), if Cj < Ĉj ,
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, the threshold values are given by
Ĉj ≡ τθ
1− τθ2
(
1 + θ2
2
Ki
)1/σ
, C˜j ≡ τθ
1− τθ2K
1/σ
i , C˘j ≡
1
θ(τ − 1)K
1/σ
i ,
and the functions Cdi (Cj), C¯
d
i (Cj) are implicitly defined by
Cdi (Cj) : Ci − θCj = φ
(
Cj+θCi
Ci
)1/σ
, φi ≡
(
1+θ2
2θ(1+τ)Ki
)1/σ
,
C¯di (Cj) : Ci − θCj = ψ
(
Ci
Ci+θCj
)1/σ
, ψi ≡
(
1+τ
τ Ki
)1/σ
.
It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 and the fact that K1 < K2 that the equilibria of this game in
general formulation are fully characterized in Proposition 1. Figure 14 depicts the alternative equilibria
under symmetric best responses (cf. figures 3 and 4).
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
BR2
C1
C2
BR1
C1
C2
Figure 14: Equilibria in the symmetric envy game.
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